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FUTURE INTERESTS-Implying a Requirement of
Survival in Future Interests: Continued
Confusion-Schau v. Cecil*
Testator devised a portion of the family homestead to his son
Everett, but provided that "should my son Everett not survive me or
he should die without issue, then and in that event, the real estate
devised to him herein, I devise to my son Cecil Kelly, conditioned
upon the payment by him of Two Thousand ($2,000.00) to each of
my daughters.'' After testator's death Everett died without issue and
the heirs of Cecil, who had predeceased Everett, brought an action
which necessitated a construction of the instrument. The trial
court ruled that the gift over to Cecil was conditioned upon his
surviving his brother Everett so that at Everett's death without issue
the property did not go to the heirs of Cecil, but rather reverted to
the testator's estate and, there being no residuary clause, descended
intestate to the heirs of the testator. On appeal the Iowa Supreme
Court affirmed, holding that one who receives a remainder in real
property, contingent upon the happening of a dubious and uncertain event, must be alive at the time the event occurs in order for
his interest in the property to become possessory.1
Contingent future interests have caused considerable confusion
in cases in which the holder of the future interest dies before the
fulfillment of the condition. This confusion stems from a tendency
by some courts to use the word "contingent" as a shorthand way of
indicating that the interest holder must survive until a certain time
or event. A future interest is correctly said to be "contingent" when
it is subject to a condition, in addition to the termination of the
prior estate, which must occur before the interest becomes a present
estate.2 The t:1vo usages of the word are often overlapping, but they
are not synonymous; although a requirement of survival is the most
• 136 N.W.2d 515 (Iowa, 1965) [hereinafter cited as principal case].
1. Principal case at 519.
2. 1 FEARNE, CONTINGENT RE!',IAINDERS S (10th ed. 1844); GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST
PERPETUTI11ES § 101 (4th ed. 1942); 2 POWELL, REAL PROPER.TY 11 274 (recomp. 1966); 2
SIMES 8c SMITH, FUTURE INIERESTS § 571 (2d ed. 1956); RESTATEMENT, PROl'Ell.TY § 157
(1936).
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common type of condition rendering an interest contingent,3 it is
only one of many types of conditions which may be imposed.
The Iowa Supreme Court viewed the primary issue as simply a
question of determining whether Cecil's interest was a vested or
a contingent remainder. 4 It is clear that the court was correct in its
decision that the interest in question was contingent, since it could
take effect at the termination of the prior estate only on the uncertain condition that Everett would die without having children living at his death. 5 The question, however, remains: whether it was
necessary for Cecil to survive Everett for his interest to become
possessory.
The only language in the will which might suggest a condition
of survival is the requirement that Cecil pay $2,000 to each of his
sisters. If the requirement of payment is considered personal to the
holder of the interest, a condition of survival until the date of the
payment might be implied. Most courts, however, refusing to construe such provisions as a condition precedent to acquiring a right
to the property, have held that they create a lien upon the property
to secure payment of the legacy by whoever eventually takes possession of the property which is the subject of the gift. 6 An important
reason for such holdings is that a reading of the whole will containing a requirement of payment to other heirs usually reveals that the
testator's purpose in inserting such a provision was to equalize the
distribution of his estate among his heirs, rather than to impose a
condition of survival. The court in the principal case did not even
consider the possible significance of the payment provision, which
would indicate that it believed that the issue of survivorship was
disposed of once the court had found that the interest was contingent. Without further explanation the court said, "When one takes
only a contingent remainder in real estate conditioned upon the
3. BROWDER &: '\.\TELLMAN, FAMILY PROPERTY SETILEMENTS 25 (1965); 2 SIMES &:
SMrm, op. cit. supra note 2, § 575.
4. Principal case at 518.
5. One might take issue with the court's characterization of Cecil's interest as a
remainder, since it was one which had to divest a fee simple estate in order to take
effect in possession. Such interests have been traditionally known as executory interests
rather than remainders. 2 POWELL, op. cit. supra note 2, ,I 272; 1 SIMES 8: SMITII, op. cit.
supra note 2, § 191; RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 25 (1936). The difference in terminology
is relatively unimportant, however, since Iowa and most other states have, by statute
or decision, abolished the destructibility of contingent remainders, the characteristic
which distinguishes them from executory interests. E.g., IowA CODE §§ 557.6-.9 (1962).
At common law if the preceeding freehold estate supporting the contingent remainder
and the reversion became united in the same person before the remainder vested, they
were merged, thereby destroying the contingent remainder. Likewise if a contingent
remainder did not vest prior to or at the termination of the supporting estate it failed,
since it could not divest another estate. The Iowa statute abolished both of these
attributes of contingent remainders.
6. E.g., Schrader v. Schrader, 158 Iowa 85, 139 N.W, 160 (1912). See also RESTATE•
MENT, PROPERTY § 262 (1940).
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happening of a future event he must live until the event occurs in
order to take any interest in the real estate." 7
The holding in the principal case is not only contrary to the
historical definition of contingent remainders, but it is without
support in Iowa law. The Iowa cases cited by the court clearly do not
justify its holding. In one of the cases cited by the court, a requirement of survival was implied by use of the so-called "divide and
pay" rule which provides that when the only language creating the
gift is in the direction to divide and pay at a future date, the devisee
must survive until the time of payment. 8 In another case, the use of
the word "or" in a postponed alternative gift "to A or B" was construed to imply a condition of survival on the part of A until the
termination of the preceding estate. 9 In the other cases relied upon
by the court, there were words expressing a requirement of survival
in the language of the gifts under consideration.10 In none of the
cases was it held that a condition unrelated to survival implied a
condition of survival. Moreover, in each of these cases the interest in
question was found to be contingent because there was a condition
of survival, not the reverse.
In the majority of American jurisdictions in which the question
has been presented, it has been held that when a future interest is
subject only to an express condition unrelated to survival, an additional requirement of survival to the time of the fulfillment of the
express condition is not to be implied.11 Two recent cases from different jurisdictions have stated this proposition very clearly. In
Estate of Ferry 12 the California Supreme Court considered a gift
which was almost identical to the gift in the principal case. The gift,
7. Principal case at 519.
8. Fulton v. Fulton, 179 Iowa 948, 162 N.W. 253 (1917). The "divide and pay" rule
has been generally discredited as a ground for implying a condition of survival and is
no longer accepted in Iowa today. See Lytle v. Guilliams, 241 Iowa 523, 41 N.W.2d 668
(1950); 2 POWELL, op. cit. supra note 2, 1J 333; REsTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 260 (1940).
9. Henkel v. Auchstetter, 240 Iowa 1367, 39 N.W.2d 650 (1949).
IO. In re Estate of Organ, 240 Iowa 797, 38 N.W.2d 100 (1949); Bladt v. Bladt, 191
Iowa 1345, 181 N.W. 765 (1921).
11. See, e.g., In re Ferry's Estate, 55 Cal. 2d 776, 361 P.2d 900 (1961); Hofing v.
Willis, 31 Ill. 2d 365, 201 N.E.2d 852 (1964); Fulton v. Teager, 183 Ky. 381, 209 s:W.
535 (1919); Fisher v. Wagner, 109 Md. 243, 71 Atl. 999 (1909); Boston Safe Deposit Co.
v. Alfred University, 339 Mass. 82, 157 N.E.2d 662 (1959); Anderson v. Anderson, 239
Miss. 798, 127 So. 2d 423 (1961); Tapley v. Dill, 358 Mo. 824, 217 S.W.2d 369 (1949);
Colony v. Colony, 97 N.H. 386, 89 A.2d 909 (1952); Matter of Krooss, 302 N.Y. 424, 99
N.E.2d 222 (1951); Massey's Estate, 235 Pa. 289, 83 Atl. 1087 (1912); Loring v. Arnold,
15 R.I. 428, 8 Atl. 335 (1887). The textwriters have uniformaly condemned the policy of
implying a condition of survival from an express condition unrelated to survival as
unwarranted. See, e.g., 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 21.25 (Casner ed. 1952); 2
PowELL, op. cit. supra note 2, ,i 334; 2 SIMES & SMITH, op. cit. supra note 2, § 594. The
position adopted by the Restatement is that an express condition unrelated to survival
should not be used by a court as an aid in determining whether there is a condition
of survival. RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 261 (1940).
12. 55 Cal. 2d 776,361 P.2d 900 (1961).
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to take effect upon the termination of a trust, was basically "to A
if he is alive, but if he is dead to his wife arid issue, but if he leaves
no wife and issue then to B." A died leaving no wife or issue. The
court, holding that there was no condition of survival upon the gift
to B who had predeceased A, rejected the argument that because it
was expressly provided that A had to survive until the termination
of the trust, the same contingency should be implied as to B. The
only contingency affecting B's interest was A's death leaving no wife
or issue, and the court found no reason to imply an additional
condition of survival.13 In In re Jamieson's Estate 14 the Michigan
Supreme Court dealt with a similar gift which can be expressed
simply as "to A for life, upon A's death, remainder to B if living,
and to B's heirs if he is not living." B as well as some of his heirs
predeceased A. The court held that in the absence of an express
condition of survival in the gift to B's heirs, none would be implied.
The court disapproved of earlier cases which had held to the contrary and criticized them as reaching "a conclusion required neither
by policy nor by the express language of the testator." 15
Unfortunately Iowa is not alone in erroneously using irrelevant
conditions in a future interest to imply a requirement of survival. 16
In some jurisdictions the situation is uncle~r, for the decisions hold
both ways on the question whether express conditions unrelated to
survival imply a condition of survival.17 Other jurisdictions which
have not implied a condition of survival when the contingent gift
was to a named person have experienced some difficulty when the
gift was to a class.18 When the type of class involved does not imply
a condition of survival, there is no reason to imply such a requirement simply because a condition unrelated to survival is added, as
for example in a gift "to A for life, remainder to A's children, but
if A leaves no children then to B's children." Some courts, however,
have implied a condition of survival in such a gift because the final
takers remain uncertain as long as the class can increase in membership.19 This reasoning, unfortunately, fails to recognize that the inherent ability of a class to increase in membership is unrelated to
13. Id. at 786, 361 P.2d at 904.
14. 374 Mich. 231, 132 N.W.2d I (1965).
15. Id. at 239, 132 N.W.2d at 5. The court referred to In re Wagar's Estate, 292
Mich. 425, 290 N.W. 865 (1940).
16. See Ballentine v. Foster, 128 Ala. 638, 30 So. 481 (1900); In re Coot's Estate, 253
Mich. 208, 234 N.W. 141 (1931). The Michigan legislature reversed the holding of the
last case. See MrcH. COMP. LAWS § 554.101 (1948) (enacted 1931); Stevens v. Wildey, 281
Mich. 337,275 N.W. 179 (1937).
17. Compare First Nat'! Bank v. Somers, 106 Conn. 267, 137 Atl. 737 (1927), with
Bartrum v. Powell, 88 Conn. 86, 89 Atl. 885 (1914). Compare Dusenberry v. Johnson,
59 N.J. Eq. 336, 45 Atl. 103 (1899), with Potter v. Nixon, 81 N.J. Eq. 338, 86 Atl. 444
(1913), atf'd per curiam, 82 N.J. Eq. 661, 91 Atl. 1070 (1914).
18. See, e.g., Drury v. Drury, 271 Ill. 336, Ill N.E. 140 (1915); Stoors v. Burgess, 101
Me. 26, 62 Atl. 730 (1905).
19. Jones v. Holland, 223 S.C. 500, 77 S.E.2d 202 (1953).
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the possibility of a decrease in the class due to an express condition
of survival.20
Quite frequently a contingent future interest is either in the residuary clause, or, as in the principal case, in a will which does not
contain a residuary clause. If the devisee does not meet the implied
condition of survival the property must pass by intestacy through
the testator's estate. In Iowa, as elsewhere, there is a very strong
tendency on the part of the courts to construe a will so as to avoid
intestacy on the presumption that the testator intended that his will
would completely dispose of his property.21 A court's desire to
avoid intestacy may even be so strong that it will construe as vested
an interest which traditionally has been considered contingent. For
example, when faced with a gift in the form of "to A for life, remainder to B, but if B should die without issue then to C," some
courts have construed C's gift as vested, subject to defeasance if B
should die leaving issue. 22 This somewhat strained construction is
evidently the result of a belief that the gift to C would have included
a condition of survival if it had been construed as contingent. 23 Consequently it seems incongruous for a court which seeks to avoid
intestacy to unnecessarily construe a contingent remainder as implying a condition of survival, since frequently such a construction
will produce intestacy.
_
When a court has determined that an interest is "contingent" it
has not necessarily determined the question of survivorship, but it
has probably introduced the confusion that may be caused by an
incorrect understanding of the word "contingent". Thus, when
faced with the problem of determining whether a future interest
holder must survive the happening of a contingency, it would seem
preferable to ignore the question of whether the interest is vested or
contingent; 24 a court need only ask whether the language of the will
necessitates implying a condition of survival. Unfortunately, a great
many courts, like the Iowa court in the principal case, have not confined themselves to the relevant inquiry and as a result have only
added confusion to the law of future interests. Such cases should not
be relied upon and where they continue to carry the force of
authority they should be expressly overruled.25
20. 3 POWELL, op. cit. supra note 2, ,r 365.
21. See In re Larson's Estate, 256 Iowa 1392, 131 N.W.2d 503 (1964); Moore v.
McKinley, 246 Iowa 734, 69 N.W.2d 73 (1955).
22. See, e.g., Allen v. Almy, 87 Conn. 517, 89 Atl. 205 (1914).
23. Allen v. Almy, supra; In re Patterson's Estate, 247 Pa. 529, 93 Atl. 608 (1915).
24. "[I]t is not necessary in this case to decide which of these two possible approaches is to be applied [holding the interest vested or contingent]. Both have the
same result upon the major question of the case, that question being whether an
implied condition of her surviving Joseph J. Ferry is applicable to Mary Silva's
interest." Estate of Ferry, 55 Cal. 2d 776, 783, 361 P.2d 900, 902 (1961).
25. See, e.g., Hoffing v. Willis, 31 Ill. 2d 365, 373, 201 N.E.2d 852, 856 (1964), overruling Drury v. Drury, 271 Ill. 336, 111 N.E. 140 (1915).

